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1. Introduction 
 
The adoption of PIAs in the UK is a recent development. Both it, and related initiatives such as 
“privacy by design”, pioneered by the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ann 
Cavoukian
3
 (discussed further below), can be seen as indicative of a disenchantment amongst some 
regulators, including the UK‟s national data protection regulator, the Information Commissioner‟s 
Office (ICO), with the largely reactive approach to regulation adopted by the EU Data Protection 
Directive and the national legislation which implements it. As has been argued elsewhere
4
, that 
regime, which depends heavily upon data subjects acting proactively via the subject access 
mechanism, both to ensure data controller compliance and to provide the regulator with 
information, has proven to be ineffectual in the face of contemporary technological developments. 
When one considers established technologies such as the World Wide Web, or developing 
technologies such as cloud computing, neither of these disaggregated data environments lend 
themselves to effective regulation via the Directive‟s largely post hoc processes. 
 
In addition, the ubiquity of information technology, the ease and speed of data transfers and the 
devolving of control over information within organisations have resulted in commercial and 
governmental data environments where significant personal data losses can result from the 
relatively minor actions of low-level employees or of data processors. The loss of 25 million child 
benefit records by HM Revenue and Customs, resulting from the actions of a junior civil servant, 
demonstrates clearly the problems that the incremental and unmonitored development of internal 
practices and procedures relating to personal data holdings can pose for effective organisational 
data protection compliance.   
 
In such circumstances, a clear, regulator-approved, organisational process, the goal of which is 
proactive identification and removal or amelioration of potential data privacy risks, would seem an 
attractive sell to both commercial and governmental organisations. In principle, everyone in the data 
privacy process can benefit. The data controller will benefit from engaging in a risk management 
assessment which reduces the likelihood of negative public reaction, and increases its ability to 
reduce the need for costly retroactive amendments to systems and processes. The regulator may 
have access, either as part of the process, or retrospectively, to information detailing the actions and 
decisions of the data controller based on its assessment, which would then inform its own actions in 
regard to that data controller. The data subject may have greater access to information about the 
data controller‟s processes and the steps that have been taken to ensure the integrity and security of 
their personal data. 
 
With these issues in mind, in 2007 the UK‟s ICO commissioned a report on the development and 
use of PIAs in other jurisdictions, notably Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand and the 
United States.
5
 Commissioned in tandem with the report was a practitioner handbook for PIAs.
6
 
Both report and handbook were officially launched in December 2007 at the ICO‟s conference 
“Surveillance Society: Turning Debate into Action”. In July 2010, the ICO published its Annual 
Report. In a chapter entitled “Educating and Influencing”, a small paragraph noted that “over 300 
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Privacy Impact Assessments have been started across central government and their agencies”7. Yet, 
despite this ostensible policy success for a tool that had been launched less than three years earlier
8
, 
very few UK privacy impact assessment (PIA) reports have reached the public domain. Moreover, 
evidence of private sector activity in this field is almost non-existent, being restricted to the 
occasional report
9
 or citation
10
. It is perhaps, therefore, not surprising that academic interest in PIAs 
has been limited. As of July 2010, the total number of citation counts on Google Scholar for articles 
titled “Privacy Impact Assessments” appears to be 86.11  
 
This chapter aims to stimulate interest in this topic, and address some of the gaps identified above, 
through an investigation of PIAs being processed in the UK. In order to investigate this topic, it is 
important to start with a clear definition. The meaning ascribed to the term “PIA” has varied over 
time and across most jurisdictions.
12
 In this chapter, we use the following definition, synthesised 
from descriptions given in various international guidance material for PIAs:  
 
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is a systematic process for identifying and addressing 
privacy issues in an information system that considers the future consequences for privacy of a 
current or proposed action.
13
  
 
Our analysis commences with an overview of the UK legislative and policy framework, and the 
extent to which this influenced the development of a methodology for the conduct of PIAs within 
the UK. We then consider the UK PIA process, drawing from examples of PIAs undertaken since 
the publication of the ICO‟s PIA handbook. The practicalities of conducting a PIA are illustrated 
through a case study of the UK 2011 census, informed by empirical research conducted by the 
authors during July and August 2010. This is followed by a discussion of lessons learnt from the 
national experience to date, identifying potential pitfalls, misconceptions and gaps in understanding. 
We then discuss possible future directions for PIAs in the UK, paying attention to the drive towards 
a proactive approach to regulation, the influence of cross-jurisdictional technologies and the 
involvement of the private sector in creating and using systems to facilitate accountability and 
compliance. Finally, conclusions are drawn.   
 
2. Legislative and policy framework 
 
As noted above, the methodology for the conduct of PIAs in the UK was officially launched in 
December 2007 by the Information Commissioner‟s Office. It took the form of a practitioner 
handbook (available electronically and, later, in hard copy), supported by a study investigating the 
use of PIAs overseas and the lessons learnt from their experiences.
14
 When developing the 
methodology for the UK, the team commissioned by the ICO were mindful of the fact that no 
previous official guidance had been published and that, at the time, there was no formal legislative 
                                                          
7
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4 
basis, or governmental support, for the process. Consequently, the potential benefits to 
organisations had to be explicitly stated, and the tool itself had to be sufficiently flexible so as to be 
capable of being integrated within existing business processes. In addition, the project team, in their 
study, recommended that the ICO aim for a “structured and timetabled roll-out” of PIAs, 
encouraging organisations to develop internal expertise in PIA processes.
15
  
 
A quarter century of increasingly rigorous UK data protection legislation has encouraged the 
development of strong networks of knowledgeable data protection officers (for example, NADPO
16
 
and the Data Protection Forum
17
), creating regular opportunities for cross-organisational learning. 
There is also a long history of developing codes of practice within related sectors through umbrella 
groups (for example, ACPO
18
 and the CCTV User Group
19
). In theory, such groups could have 
influential roles in the introduction and promotion of PIAs. 
 
Legislation 
 
Since 1984, the UK has had overarching data protection legislation covering both public and private 
sectors. The most recent iteration, the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998), implemented the EU 
Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC).  This extended the prior regime under the Data Protection 
Act 1984 to include, amongst other changes, extension of coverage to manual files; creation of a 
new category of sensitive personal data, subject to more rigorous processing preconditions; 
additional security requirements; increased, and stronger, rights for individual data subjects; and the 
prohibition of transfers of personal data to countries outside the European Economic Area, subject 
to certain conditions being satisfied.
20
  
 
At the European level, Art. 20 of the Data Protection Directive requires that processing operations 
likely to present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects should be examined prior 
to their start, an intervention described as “prior checking”: 
  
1. Member States shall determine the processing operations likely to present specific risks to the 
rights and freedoms of data subjects and shall check that these processing operations are 
examined prior to the start thereof.  
2. Such prior checks shall be carried out by the supervisory authority following receipt of a 
notification from the controller or by the data protection official, who, in cases of doubt, must 
consult the supervisory authority.  
3. Member States may also carry out such checks in the context of preparation either of a 
measure of the national parliament or of a measure based on such a legislative measure, which 
define the nature of the processing and lay down appropriate safeguards. 
 
S. 22 of the DPA 1998 provides for a version of prior checking by requiring that, as part of the 
notification process, certain processing might be assessed by the ICO for compliance with the 
provisions of the Act before the processing begins. The type of processing must specified in an 
Order made by the Secretary of State, if it is considered that processing would be particularly likely 
to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to data subjects or otherwise significantly to 
prejudice the rights and freedoms of data subjects. While the UK government identified three 
possible categories of processing that might be covered by such “preliminary assessment” (data 
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matching, processing involving genetic data and processing by private investigators), to date, no 
such order has been made in the UK. Indeed, Elizabeth France, while Information Commissioner: 
 
…was of the opinion that “no „assessable processing‟ should be designated”, i.e. that no 
processing operations should be made subject to a prior assessment at all.
21
  
 
This rejection of prior assessment likely stemmed from the lack of necessary in-house technology 
expertise at the ICO which would have been required in order for such „prior assessments‟ to have 
constituted a meaningful oversight mechanism.  Other EU Member States have adopted prior 
checks for particular types of processing relating, for example, to sensitive data, offences and 
criminal convictions, and genetic data.
22
  
 
Previous research undertaken for the ICO
23
 suggested that the UK should reconsider its position on 
prior checking. It is possible that wider use of PIAs could form part of such a process as they 
would: 
 facilitate the process of prior checking by allowing the supervisory authority to draw upon the 
results of PIAs incorporated into organisational processes, such as risk assessments for new or 
redesigned projects; 
 broaden the pool of organisational privacy understanding and expertise such that organisations 
will be more readily aware of the need for prior checking when it is appropriate, and better able 
to supply the supervisory authority with appropriate information about the project or process for 
an appropriate prior-checking assessment or decision to be made efficiently. 
 
It is clear, however, that while supervisory authority prior checking in specific circumstances may 
be provided for in the UK data privacy regime, it is not in itself synonymous with the PIA process, 
as currently understood.   
 
Thus, while they are capable of supporting a legislated (if largely unused) prior assessment process, 
PIAs themselves have no statutory footing in the UK, and thus cannot be made a legally mandated 
process for either the public or private sector, without further legislative enactment.  However, as in 
other jurisdictions, recent developments in the UK have resulted in a requirement being placed on 
some parts of the public sector (and anecdotally it appears, indirectly on quasi-public and private 
organisations exercising public sector functions) to adopt PIAs, as a required element of internal 
project development processes. 
 
Policy 
 
Although the introduction of PIAs into the UK was primarily promoted by the production of the 
ICO-commissioned handbook, further impetus was added by a number of data handling scandals 
involving public and private sector organisations.
24
 Arguably the highest profile incident, the loss of 
25 million child benefit records by HM Revenue and Customs, resulted in a Cabinet Office review. 
The resulting report, Data Handling Procedures in Government (the “Data Handling Review”), 
mandated the use of PIAs in central government departments from July 2008. The Data Handling 
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 Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR), Children’s Databases – Safety and Privacy: A Report for the 
Information Commissioner, March/August 2006, p.187. 
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Review drew attention to the benefits of this process, stating the ICO had made “a powerful case” 
for government to adopt PIAs, which, if carried out at an early stage 
 
enable organisations to anticipate and address the likely impacts of new initiatives, foresee 
problems, and negotiate solutions. Risks can be managed through the gathering and sharing of 
information with stakeholders. Systems can be designed to avoid unnecessary privacy intrusion, 
and features can be built in from the outset that reduce any impact on privacy. The Privacy 
Impact Assessment adopts a risk management process approach, periodic reports from which 
[Privacy Impact Assessment Reports] may be published or distributed to stakeholders.
25
  
 
In addition, the review called for the process to be built into existing government reviews of 
information and technology projects.
26
 The ICO has incorporated this advice into its own policy 
approach, eschewing the production of templates and instead encouraging organisations to “embed” 
PIAs within existing processes, for example, when seeking information assurance accreditation or 
engaging on public consultations.
27
 
 
In this context, PIAs support accountability, efficient management and effective incorporation of 
risk assessments into key decision-making processes. In the private sector, further motivations may 
be at play, for example, conferring competitive advantage, demonstrating legal compliance, saving 
money and preventing adverse publicity. In short, PIAs can be regarded as more beneficial to 
organisations than to individuals. The need to convince agencies and businesses that they are the 
right thing to do for “business” reasons trumps the ostensible goal of protecting and advancing 
privacy rights.
28
 
 
3. The UK PIA process 
 
The UK PIA process is outlined in the ICO handbook, updated in June 2009.
29
 As the size of 
projects and the degree of privacy risk involved vary enormously, the ICO guidance seeks to direct 
organisations to conducting the most appropriate level of assessment. The processes consist of the 
following: 
 
Process Action 
Initial assessment 
 
Examines the project at an early stage, identifies stakeholders, assesses privacy risks 
and decides whether a PIA is necessary and, if so, what level of PIA is required. 
Full-scale PIA An in-depth internal assessment of privacy risks and liabilities, consisting of five 
phases usually conducted in sequence. They include the following:  
i. Preliminary: establishes and ensures a firm basis for the PIA, so that it can 
be conducted effectively and efficiently. 
ii. Preparation: makes the arrangements needed to enable the following phase 
(i.e., consultation and analysis) to run smoothly. 
iii. Consultation and analysis: identifies problems early on, discovers effective 
                                                          
25
 Cabinet Office, Data Handling Procedures in Government: Final Report, Cabinet Office, London, 2008, p.19. 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/65948/dhr080625.pdf 
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solutions and ensures that the design is adapted to include those solutions. 
iv. Documentation: documents the PIA process and the outcomes and delivers a 
PIA report. 
v. Review and audit: ensures that the undertakings arising from the 
consultation and analysis phase are actually within the running system or 
implemented project. 
Small-scale PIA Similar to a full-scale PIA, but less formalised and requires less exhaustive 
information-gathering and analysis and usually focuses on specific aspects of a 
project. 
Privacy law 
compliance check 
Examines compliance with statutory powers, duties and prohibitions in relation to the 
use and disclosure of personal information. 
Data protection 
compliance check 
Checks for compliance with the Data Protection Act of 1998. An organisation usually 
conducts this check when the project is more fully formed.  
Table 1: UK PIA process: an overview 
 
To be effective, a PIA needs to be conducted at a stage where it can “genuinely affect the 
development of a project”30. It therefore needs to be seen as a separate process from compliance 
checks or data protection audits, both of which comprise analyses of systems already in place 
“against a prevailing legal, management or technology standard”31. Conversely, a PIA aims to 
prevent problems arising, and hence to avoid subsequent expense and disruption.
32
 The ICO advises 
that responsibility for PIAs be placed at a senior executive level – ideally, the lead for risk 
management, audit or compliance – in order to reflect the strategic importance of the exercise. The 
guidance recommends a team or committee approach, with the PIA usually conducted by a senior 
member of the project team. This can include, with varying degrees of participation, the following 
personnel: 
 Programme and project managers 
 Privacy policy advisors 
 Legal advisors 
 Records management staff 
 Information technology or data security experts 
 Communications staff 
 Other functional specialists, as appropriate.33 
 
Examples of PIAs conducted in the UK are outlined in Table 2, below. 
 
Organisation Project / procedure assessed Type of PIA 
UK Anti-Doping (2010
34
)  The disclosure of personal data to UK Anti-Doping by the 
Serious Organised Crime Agency 
Small-scale 
Northern Ireland Statistics 
and Research Agency 
(NISRA) (2010) 
2011 census for Northern Ireland Full-scale 
Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) (2009) 
2011 census for England and Wales Full-scale 
UK Border Agency (2009) Exchange of fingerprint information with immigration 
authorities in Australia, Canada, United States and New 
Zealand 
Small-scale 
                                                          
30
 Ibid., p. 3. 
31
 ICO, Privacy Impact Assessments: international study…, op. cit., fn. 5, p. 1. 
32
 ICO, Privacy Impact Assessment Handbook, op. cit., fn. 29. 
33
 Tancock et al., The Emergence of Privacy Impact Assessments, op. cit., fn. 12. 
34
 The year in this column relates to the year of publication of the PIA report. 
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National Policing 
Improvement Agency 
(2009) 
Electronic exchange of police intelligence across England and 
Wales via the Police National Database 
Full-scale 
Table 2: PIAs conducted in the UK 
 
Some organisations employ external consultants to carry out a PIA, either because they believe that 
they do not possess the necessary skills in-house, or they wish the PIA to be perceived as being as 
independent as possible from potential influences within the organisation. Some examples are 
outlined in Table 3, below. 
 
Organisation Type of privacy impact assessed 
Consultancy 
employed 
Aegate (Pharmaceutical 
authentication services) 
Use of RFID technologies to authenticate prescription 
pharmaceuticals at the point of sale  
Enterprise Privacy 
Group 
Department for 
Transport  
National time-distance-place road pricing policy
35
 
Enterprise Privacy 
Group 
Phorm Inc. Behavioural targeted advertising 80/20 Thinking Ltd 
Table 3: Examples of PIAs outsourced to consultants  
 
External consultants often bring considerable experience to the PIA process, lending impartiality to 
the process. They can offer frank advice when initiatives are deemed to be unwise or ill-conceived, 
and tend to have greater expertise and familiarity with relevant legislation.
36
 Yet, there are 
disadvantages. Smaller organisations may find them prohibitively expensive. Moreover, there is 
scepticism about consultants using “cookie cutter” PIAs whereby the same templates are used for 
vastly different clients.
37
 There is also a risk that organisations will seek to use external consultants 
to attempt to “legitimise” controversial projects or applications. For example, a “PIA” conducted in 
2008 by the consultancy group 80/20 Thinking Ltd for Phorm, a company specialising in targeted 
online advertising, generated considerable debate among privacy experts, and in sections of the 
mainstream media, about the motivations behind the exercise.
38
 In practice, the exercise undertaken 
by 80/20 Thinking Ltd cannot be accurately described as a PIA, given that the technology and its 
applications were already fully developed and in use in business operations, and Phorm was clearly 
seeking to retrospectively validate those applications rather than to establish any potential impact on 
privacy with an eye to proactive mitigation.  A more accurate description of the exercise undertaken 
would thus be a privacy audit or compliance check.
39
   
 
We will now consider the processes involved in the conduct of a PIA at the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS), which is responsible for producing official statistics and conducting surveys on 
behalf of the UK government.  
 
4. Case study: Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2011 census   
 
The ONS, as the executive arm of the UK Statistics Authority, is responsible for conducting the 
census in England and Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland are subject to separate censuses 
carried out by their devolved agencies. The census is compulsory throughout the UK, and is 
                                                          
35
 In this system of road pricing, vehicle owners are charged based on when, where and how much they drive.  
36
 ICO, Privacy Impact Assessments: international study…, op. cit., fn. 5. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 See, for example, Arthur, Charles, “Simon Davies (of Privacy International, and 80/20 Thinking) on Phorm“, 
Technology Blog, The Guardian, 20 March 2008. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2008/mar/20/simondaviesofprivacyintern. See also  BBC News, “Phorm 
needs „better protection‟”, 18 March 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7303426.stm  
39
 80/20 Thinking Ltd., op. cit., fn. 9. 
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conducted every 10 years. The next survey is due to be carried out in 2011 and, according to the 
ONS, the data collected will be used “solely for the production of statistics and statistical 
research”40. The legal basis for conducting a national census was established by the Census Act 
1920. This is supported by the Census Order (directing that a particular census of the population 
shall be taken) and Census Regulations (covering procedural and practical arrangements for the 
census). Both the Order and the Regulations are laid before both Houses of Parliament.
41
 The 
census provides three broad categories of information: 
 
 Counts of population units – people, households and dwellings; 
 Population structures – e.g., family and household relationships, ethnic groups; 
 Population and housing characteristics – e.g., health, employment and qualifications.42  
 
As these statistics are published for small population groups (down to approximately 125 
households or 250 people) and are cross-tabulated with other variables, effective privacy safeguards 
governing the collection and use of personal data are paramount. Accordingly, publication of the 
results of the census is subject to additional statutes including the DPA 1998 and the Statistics and 
Service Registration Act 2007. This legislative framework is supported by a detailed procedural 
review, undertaken by the ONS over the last four decades, of the methods and processes 
underpinning each census.
43
 Thus, the review process prior to the 2011 census commenced in 2002 
by posing the question: “Is there a need for another census?”. Once that question was answered in 
the affirmative, preparations began in earnest, with a series of consultations over the census design 
(to ensure accurate population counts, maximise overall response, provide high quality statistics) 
and questionnaire content (so that it produced useful outputs, catered for small population groups, 
served the UK as a whole). As a result, the ONS were fully cognisant of the process-orientated 
approach advocated in the ICO's PIA handbook. As the internal processes assessing the 2011 census 
were well advanced by the time the handbook was published in 2007, the ONS conducted its “PIA” 
on work that had largely been done. Although this approach runs counter to the prospective nature 
of the PIA, it is nevertheless instructive to follow the processes enacted by the ONS as it sought to 
identify privacy risks inherent in conducting the census, and develop solutions to “accept, mitigate 
or avoid them”44.  
 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty encountered by the ONS was in locating appropriate expertise on 
PIAs. Following the ICO's publication of the PIA handbook, and its subsequent promotion of the 
tool, the ONS met with representatives from the data protection regulator during 2008 and 2009. 
These meetings could be deemed successful in that they reinforced the need for the ONS to build on 
its existing internal review process to consider, in greater detail, new arrangements for the 2011 
census compared with the 2001 census; highlight any changes that raised new privacy concerns; and 
describe the safeguards put in place to protect the privacy of all census respondents.
45
 Moreover, the 
ONS was clearly persuaded during these discussions that it “had little choice” but to conduct the 
PIA. It immediately elected for the full-scale PIA (without considering the screening process 
outlined in the handbook) as (i) the census programme was “so important” and (ii) it “would be 
expected” of them. Yet, although the ONS found the PIA handbook to be helpful, especially in 
                                                          
40
 ONS, Report of a Privacy Impact Assessment conducted by the Office for National Statistics in relation to the 2011 
Census England and Wales, Office for National Statistics, London, 2009, p. 4.  
http://www.ons.gov.uk/census/2011-census/2011-census-project/commitment-to-confidentiality/privacy-impact-
assessment--pia--on-2011-census.pdf 
41
 The National Assembly for Wales is consulted in the making of any Census Order. Moreover, Welsh Ministers are 
now responsible the Regulation in Wales.  
42
 ONS, op. cit., fn. 40, p. 4. 
43
 Much of the information in this section is based on a telephone conversation with an ONS representative (August 
2010). 
44
 ONS, op. cit., fn. 40, p. 6. 
45
 Ibid., p. 5. 
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outlining the processes to be enacted and requiring it to check legal compliance, it was unable to 
make contact with anyone with direct experience of conducting PIAs in the UK. The handbook 
“contained a lot of processes but did not tell [the ONS] what to do”46. This proved to be the greatest 
stumbling block. In the absence of a referral from the ICO, exemplar PIA reports conducted by 
other UK government departments or a list of approved consultants with suitable expertise, the 
ONS resorted to consulting PIA reports conducted by public bodies in New Zealand and the United 
States.
47
 At the time, there appeared to be a clear PIA “skills gap” within UK organisations and a 
need for PIA processes to be incorporated within the professional training of those responsible for 
leading the assessment, for example, through the Managing Successful Programmes, a project 
management course taught at the UK‟s National School of Government. 
 
In addition, the ONS expressed disappointment with the response to its stakeholder consultation. In 
spite of receiving a list of civil society organisations from the ICO, and issuing direct invitations to 
these and related bodies, representatives from only two groups attended the consultation event (with 
another individual contributing via e-mail) and neither provided particularly meaningful feedback. 
This experience suggests the need for a clearer, more consistent process for ensuring wider societal 
engagement with PIAs, particularly in the early stages of projects. This could be achieved through 
more innovative means of publicising ongoing PIAs, possibly via a dedicated portal or one-stop 
shop. This would raise the profile of PIAs, particularly if organisations are also encouraged to 
publish Plain Language PIA reports, and increase the obligation for civil society groups to 
participate in policy processes affecting citizens‟ personal privacy.  
 
On the whole, the ONS reported that conducting the PIA process did not cause it to uncover 
anything “unexpected” in its approach to the 2011 census. In part, this may be due to its existing 
adherence to a series of rigorous, well-established rolling consultation processes in preparation for 
each upcoming census. Nevertheless, the PIA did prove helpful in “pulling together” various 
strands of the ONS‟s work and providing further evidence (through publication of a PIA report) 
that, as an organisation, it was taking privacy seriously. This was reflected in the section in the ONS 
PIA report relating to the legal basis for the 2011 census, which was stated to owe the most to the 
ICO PIA handbook.
48
 Finally, the ONS was conscious of the largely retrospective nature of the PIA 
conducted. In some respects, this was unavoidable due to the PIA handbook being published so far 
into the ONS‟s own internal review process for the 2011 census. Nevertheless, the ONS stated that, 
with hindsight, it would have consulted with the ICO and engaged with stakeholders at a much 
earlier stage in process, recognising that there is little point in involving these groups unless they 
have a realistic opportunity to alter the design and implementation of the project.    
 
5. Lessons learnt 
 
In the report commissioned by the ICO
49
, it was noted that PIAs were generally perceived to be 
more effective when  
 they offer a prospective identification of privacy risks before systems and programmes are put in 
place;  
 they assess the proposed initiatives within a framework which takes into account the broader set 
of community values and expectations about privacy; 
                                                          
46
 Telephone conversation, ONS representative, August 2010. 
47
 The ONS representative was aware of a PIA report conducted by the Department of Finance and Personnel in 
Northern Ireland. However, it related to a vastly different topic – a review of domestic rating systems, with a view to 
encouraging various groups to take up domestic rate reliefs. See – Department of Finance and Personnel (Northern 
Ireland), Review of Domestic Rating Data Sharing Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), Bangor, 2008.  
48
 Telephone conversation, op. cit., fn. 46.  
49
 ICO, Privacy Impact Assessments: international study…, op. cit., fn. 5, pp. 29-30. 
 
 
11 
 they refer to an entire process of assessment of privacy risks rather than a statement or end-
product;  
 they have, and are perceived to have, the potential to alter proposed initiatives in order to 
mitigate privacy risks;  
 their scope and depth are sensitive to a number of crucial variables: the size of the organisation, 
the sensitivity of the personal data, the forms of risk, the intrusiveness of the technology;  
 they are part of a system of incentives, sanctions and review, and/or where they are embedded in 
project workflows or quality assurance processes, as is common with other forms of risk 
assessment;  
 the individuals charged with completing PIAs not only have good programme knowledge, but 
also have access to multidisciplinary expertise from a variety of perspectives – privacy law and 
practice, information security, records management and other functional specialists as 
appropriate;  
 the PIA tool is accessible, readily available and easy to access, and the process involved is 
flexible;  
 there is a process of formal or informal external review either by central agencies or privacy 
oversight bodies;  
 there is a strong advocacy role played by the relevant oversight body; 
 there is external consultation with outsiders affected by the initiative. Public consultation is 
often advised; 
 there is transparency, and the resulting statements or reports are published. Openness of process 
and output enhances trust in the initiative being proposed.  
 
Some initial observations on these points from the UK context can be made. The available evidence 
suggests that ICO has clearly worked very hard, both in public and behind the scenes, to promote 
the use of PIAs; to seek and utilise feedback to make the handbook more user friendly; and to 
encourage government agencies which have undertaken PIAs to make their reports public. The 
focus of the ICO‟s work has been government, and it appears that there has been relatively little 
interaction with the private sector. Criticism could perhaps be levelled at the ICO with regard to the 
review of Phorm‟s business undertaken by 80/20 Thinking Ltd. (see above), where a clear public 
statement why an ex post facto review of an existing business practice should not be viewed as a 
PIA would have been useful, but was not forthcoming. The Phorm example also suggests that there 
was, initially at least, a paucity of expertise on PIAs available to organisations wishing to undertake 
them, and that this, depending on one‟s perspective on that particular instance, could mean that an 
organisation might misunderstand the purpose of the process, or might cynically seek to 
mischaracterise it.  The last three years have seen a considerable upturn in consultants claiming PIA 
expertise, and organisations such as the Enterprise Privacy Group have been instrumental in helping 
government departments tackle PIAs for complex and potentially controversial projects. 
 
In terms of guidance, the Ministry of Justice is responsible for advising government departments, 
and has recently published a short guidance document on handling PIAs.
50
 However, the Ministry 
of Justice does not itself review departmental PIA processes or reports, and may not be informed 
when PIAs are undertaken. As such, detailed data protection responsibilities, including establishing 
PIA processes, are routinely devolved to individual departments. There does not currently appear to 
be any central co-ordination of officials or civil servants with PIA experience across government 
departments; any central guidance as to the type of projects that would fall within the “mandatory” 
PIA requirement; or any central guidance on appropriate or approved consultants. Based on the 
experience of organisations in other jurisdictions, particularly the Canadian federal jurisdiction, it 
seems likely that there will continue to be a PIA skills gap both within UK organisations and in the 
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consultancy market going forward.  Encouraging departments to share PIA tools, templates and 
frameworks across government will help to overcome that gap and hasten the spread of PIA good 
practice and innovation. 
 
The UK has no formal process of external review by central agencies or by the ICO. As noted 
above, the ICO has played a key advisory role, but would unlikely be able to take on a formal 
scrutiny role, at least in the form the regulator currently takes. As a result, its role has been 
primarily in advising on methodology and helping organisations to embed PIA processes in existing 
practices. Following the Data Handling Review, the Cabinet Office has responsibility for 
monitoring the use of PIAs in government, although it is not clear exactly how it intends to carry 
out this monitoring and/or enforcement role. As such, there is insufficient evidence at present to 
determine whether or not the ad hoc processes of review currently in place are, or will be, effective 
at ensuring that government agencies fully engage, or engage effectively, with the PIA process. 
While any move to a mandatory review of PIAs is highly unlikely, a requirement that government 
departments provide notification and/or submission of outputs including PIA reports to either the 
Cabinet office, or the ICO, would facilitate oversight by allowing them to request and review 
selected PIAs of particular interest, and to engage in more targeted departmental, sectoral or 
government-wide compliance audits. 
 
The focus on departmental responsibility, the apparent lack of PIA cross-fertilization across 
departmental boundaries, and what appears to be relatively “hands-off” oversight raise questions 
about the current ability of governmental PIA processes to deal with privacy issues at a strategic 
level. In other words, how would a department approach a decision to create or adapt a system or 
policy, which arises from the actions of a higher level of government, e.g., the Executive or 
Parliament, or a decision where the carrying out of policy requires inter or multi-departmental 
input? For example, the policy behind plans to share data across government departments in the UK 
may come from the Executive, and require implementing measures across a number of departments. 
If each department is responsible for its own PIA process, then there is a risk that privacy failures 
that arise directly from the Executive decision, or from issues that are not the specific responsibility 
of any one department, are not appropriately addressed. Another problem may arise where the 
cumulative effect of programmes initiated by different departments upon the individual are not 
addressed. For example, Department A seeks to initiate a project involving an individual‟s personal 
data. Before doing so, they carry out a departmental PIA. Their PIA alerts them to the privacy risks 
for individuals of their particular project but, in the absence of knowledge about projects in other 
Departments, may not take account of the cumulative risk posed by that collection in combination 
with the collections of personal information by Departments B, C and D. 
 
Although the value of “inward-facing” use of PIAs to inform management risk assessments appears 
to be increasingly established, at least in government agencies, the use of PIAs for “public-facing” 
activities seems much less developed.  This may be due to the fact that the ICO has emphasised the 
self-assessment nature of PIAs, with the focus on process and not on generating documentation for 
public review. Currently, obtaining information about the conduct of PIAs, or information relating 
to specific PIA outcomes, is far from easy. There may well be “over 300 Privacy Impact 
Assessments … started across central government and their agencies”51, but there is little evidence 
of that activity available to the public. Equally, it appears that the paucity of PIA-related 
information and reports is depriving other government agencies of a potentially valuable source of 
information, which may result in departments having to “reinvent the wheel” when setting up PIA 
processes. There are some publicly available PIA reports, for example: 
 
 The UK Border Agency‟s PIA report on the exchange of fingerprint information with 
immigration authorities in Australia, Canada, New Zealand  and the United States (38 pages) is 
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readily available from their website, and it is clearly envisaged that continuing public feedback 
will be part of the “evergreening” process for the document, i.e. it is intended that the document 
will be used as a focus for ongoing privacy evaluation
52
; 
 The National Policing Improvement Agency‟s PIA report on the Police National Database (42 
pages) is available from their website, and was published with the intent that it might stimulate 
further input, as the initial PIA process received “a low number of responses” from a “narrow 
range of organisations”53; 
 The Office for National Statistics‟ PIA report on the 2011 Census in England and Wales (62 
pages) is available from their website. This report is less obviously geared towards continuing 
public engagement, possibly due to the ONS‟s existing policy of engaging in ongoing 
consultation on the census
54
. 
 
But these examples seem to be the exception rather than the rule across government. While it is 
possible that information on ongoing and completed PIAs could be obtained by the public via 
freedom of information requests
55
, the apparent reluctance on the part of government agencies to 
promote and disseminate their PIA outcomes would seem to run counter to the public engagement 
ethos that underpins the ICO‟s initiatives.  
 
In the public sector, more thought needs to be given to developing a coherent approach to PIA 
consultation and dissemination. A key weakness in other jurisdictions has been the generally 
unstructured approach to these issues. At present in the UK, as elsewhere, there is: 
 no consistent process for ensuring effective consultation with stakeholders, notably the general 
public, e.g., a register of ongoing PIAs, consultation periods and relevant contact details; 
 no consistency in reporting formats for PIAs, whether in draft or completed, e.g., a PIA might 
be reported in a detailed 62-page document, or simply mentioned in a paragraph in a general 
impact statement
56
; and,  
 no strategy for ensuing that where PIA decisions and reports are made publicly available, that 
they are easily accessible, perhaps from a centralised point, e.g., the UK Office of Public Sector 
Information (OPSI) or the ICO.   
 
If the public are unaware of consultations, are unable to effectively parse reports or compare the 
relative quality of reports from different agencies, or are unable to easily access reports, then poor 
public engagement and ineffective tripartite regulation of agency practices (i.e. through the 
interaction of regulator, regulated, and public or public representative bodies) of agency practices 
are almost inevitable.  
 
The issues raised above are not exclusive to the UK experience of PIAs. In fact, they are virtually 
all issues that have arisen in other jurisdictions, enhanced in some cases by the peculiarities or 
particularities of the UK governmental and regulatory systems. Nor are these issues insurmountable, 
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although overcoming them will likely involve a considerable degree of political will, careful 
administrative co-ordination and thoughtful public engagement. 
  
6. Future developments 
 
We would be on rather firmer ground when assessing the future of PIAs in the UK if there was 
greater certainty about the situation in the present.  However, there are several potential drivers that 
could significantly influence the future role and scope of PIAs: 
 The international drive for data privacy mechanisms that encourage proactive regulation via  
targeted and appropriate systems of accountability; 
 The influence of globalisation, combined with jurisdiction-dissolving technologies, such as the 
World Wide Web, social networking tools and cloud computing; 
 The interest of the private sector in creating and using systems to facilitate accountability and 
compliance. 
 
It is no secret, as noted in the Introduction above, that there is dissatisfaction with the current EU 
data privacy framework. Both the UK ICO
57
 and the European Commission
58
 have recently 
produced reports examining possible future developments in the EU approach to data privacy. One 
heavily promoted approach is the concept of “privacy by design”, defined as “the philosophy and 
approach of embedding privacy into the design specifications of various technologies”59. Privacy by 
design (PbD) is premised on several key principles, notably: 
 
1. Recognition of the core privacy principles as the default position in a system or process; 
2. Recognition of the organisational benefits of addressing privacy interests and concerns 
proactively and pre-emptively; 
3. Early mitigation of privacy concerns when developing IT systems and business practices, 
throughout the entire information life cycle; 
4. Embedding of privacy as a core component in the design and architecture of IT systems and 
business practices, so as to enhance both privacy and system functionality; 
5. Keeping the interests of the individual uppermost by offering strong privacy defaults, 
appropriate notice and empowering user-friendly options such as privacy-enhancing 
technologies (PETs); 
6. Business practices and technologies should be operated according to stated promises and 
objectives, and subject to independent verification; 
7. Knowledge of the organisation and of the related privacy sub-domains (legal compliance, 
technology, business operations, customer relations) is critical and requires qualified leadership 
and professional input. 
 
As such, PbD as a philosophy appears very much in tune with the light-touch approach that the UK 
ICO has tended to adopt as a regulator (although the lack, until recently, of a “big stick” may have 
played a role in this), and the ICO has already indicated support for the PbD approach. Creating a 
regulatory system premised on PbD would be simpler if PIAs were to have already become a 
familiar part of the UK data privacy regime, not least because there would be a greater pool of 
expertise and organisational and technical support to draw upon. Such a regime would also be 
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attractive to organisations seeking to utilise developing information technologies such as cloud 
computing. 
 
Cloud computing is essentially Internet-based computing, whereby a large pool of easily usable 
and accessible virtualised resources (such as hardware, development platforms and/or services) 
can be dynamically reconfigured to adjust to a variable load (scale), allowing for an optimum 
resource utilisation.
60  
 
While cloud computing technology is potentially extremely cost effective, the nature of the 
technology means that a data controller processing personal data “in the cloud” will often: 
 not have control over the machine and software that is being used (outsourcing); 
 not be able to control and may not know where in the world the data is being processed 
(offshoring); 
 not be the sole user of the hardware, platform or service (multi-tenancy/virtualisation); 
 be in a position where they may be switched automatically between systems owned by different 
suppliers automatically according to demand (autonomic technology). 
 
These features of cloud computing clearly present a significant challenge to data controllers seeking 
to adhere to the requirements found under current legislation, notably the restrictions on cross-
border data transfer. A PbD regulatory framework underpinned by effective PIAs could be the basis 
for a regime based on the use of a combination of privacy policies and contractual terms to create 
accountability in the form of transparent, enforceable commitments to responsible data handling.
61
 
The tools that might support such a framework are already under development, ranging from 
automated decision-support tools to aid organisations in undertaking effective PIAs
62
, to trusted 
computing tools for security and audit
63
 and trusted virtual platforms
64
. There is thus an incentive 
for the private sector to build upon the early work on PIAs conducted by the public sector in the UK 
to the potential benefit of both. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The UK Information Commissioner‟s Office‟s championing of the incorporation of PIAs into 
public and private sector management processes, via its commissioning of the initial research and 
the incremental development of its PIA handbook, has come at a particularly fortuitous time. A 
“perfect storm” of technological and business innovation, high profile and large-scale personal data 
leaks, and decreasing public confidence in existing data protection and privacy laws has led to 
increasing international interest in seeking more effective and efficient means to protect personal 
data and privacy. The ICO‟s work has thus been at the forefront of the next generation of PIA 
process development, and is being drawn upon by early PIA adopters, such as the Ontario 
Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC), when they come to review their existing models 
and guidance. The ICO has also been keen not to rest on its laurels, with the second iteration of the 
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PIA handbook appearing after only two years as the ICO seeks to draw upon and incorporate 
feedback from its users. 
 
In terms of adoption of PIAs, it appears that this has primarily, if not exclusively, occurred in the 
public sector, as a result of the post-Data Handling Review policy. Whilst some private sector 
companies do engage in PIA-like processes, in general, the private sector has up till now shown 
little enthusiasm for the ICO‟s handbook. Examples from other jurisdictions (e.g., the Royal Bank 
of Canada) suggest that the process envisaged in the handbook is considerably more detailed than 
current private sector requirements. 
 
To the outside onlooker, the PIA picture within the public sector appears still to be fragmented and 
confused. In contrast to the activities of the ICO, the Cabinet Office and Ministry of Justice have 
been slow to establish a framework to enable departments to plan, conduct and review PIAs in a 
manner which is consistent across government. This is problematic on two levels. First, the current 
situation appears to be an inefficient use of government resources, with departments apparently 
unable to draw effectively upon each other‟s prior experience and outputs. Second, if there is a lack 
of cross-governmental communication regarding PIAs, then their use as an effective mechanism for 
strategic review of privacy risks is signally decreased. 
 
Given the relative paucity of evidence currently available, it is difficult to provide a clear 
assessment of the state of play with regard to PIAs in the UK. The apparently inward-facing nature 
of the majority of PIAs suggests that, as with PIAs in some other jurisdictions, e.g., those carried 
out within the Ontario provincial government, PIAs are going to be used primarily as risk 
assessment tools. If this becomes the primary function of UK PIAs, then it is likely that the UK will 
fail to capture the wider public benefits of more open PIA processes.   
 
It is particularly important that organisations carrying out PIAs are not discouraged by low response 
rates to, or lack of wide public engagement with, early stage PIAs. Previously, the public have had 
no great expectation of consultation in many areas covered by PIAs, so it is unsurprising that 
current participation is limited. Wider availability of user-friendly PIA reports, combined with 
innovation in public engagement strategies should, over time, create a greater expectation amongst 
the public of involvement in policy decisions which affect their privacy. Seeking more extensive 
public engagement in both consultation and dissemination may also help to prevent PIAs from 
devolving into yet another administrative “box-ticking” exercise. 
 
 
